Utah v. Terry Arnold Messer, Jr. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Utah v. Terry Arnold Messer, Jr. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Randall C. Allen; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Messer, No. 20050309 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5722
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CaseNo.20050309-CA 
Appeal from a final order, the "Second Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment" 
entered on or about March 18, 2005, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, after jury trial, the Honorable James L. Shumate, District Judge, 
presiding. 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR., ESQ. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
160 E. 300 S. 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
RANDALL C. ALLEN, ESQ., 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Depot Plaza 
415 N. Main, Suite 303 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
The Defendant/Appellant is incarcerated. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 1 8 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20050309-CA 
TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal from a final order, the "Second Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment" 
entered on or about March 18, 2005, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, after jury trial, the Honorable James L. Shumate, District Judge, 
presiding. 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR., ESQ. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
160 E. 300 S. 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
RANDALL C. ALLEN, ESQ., 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Depot Plaza 
415 N. Main, Suite 303 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
The Defendant/Appellant is incarcerated. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CONSTITUTIONS 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 6, 8, 16, 17, 19 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 8, 16, 17, 19 
STATUTES 
U.C.A. § 78-2-2-2-(4) (1953, as amended) 1 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-503 6 
Utah Rules of Evidence 104 18 
Utah Rules of Evidence 901 18 
Utah Rules of Evidence 608 19 
Utah Rules of Evidence 804 19 
CASES 
Burton v. Zions, Coop. Mercantile Inst., 249 F. 2d 514, 517 (Utah, 1952) 6 
California v. Aceuedo, 500 U.S. 505 (1991) 12 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153 12 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) 44 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479, U.S. 367-373 (1987) 8, 13 
ComcoaTNC. V. Nee Tel Inc., 981 F. 2d 655 (10th Cir. 1991) 18 
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632,109 L. Ed 2d 1 (1990) 14 
Florida v. Wells, 495, U.S. 1, 4 (1990) 8 
Hall v. NACMIntermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97,ffl 21, 988 P.2d 942 44 
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) 13 
iv 
Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F. 2d 468,475 (10th Cir. 1985) 12 
New Yorkv. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987) 9 
Orth v. Emerson, Elec. Co., 980 F. 2d 632 (10th Cir. 1992) 18 
Pennsylvania v. Labon, 318, U.S. 938-940 (1996) (Per Curiam) 9, 12 
Pinkney v. Keane, 920 F. 2d 1090, 1999-1100 (2nd Cir. 1990) 12 
Smith v. Thornberg, 136 F. 3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1998) 12 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364-376 (1976) 9, 13 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 29 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983) 3 
State v. Freshwater, 85 P.2d 447 (Utah 1906) 41 
State v. Heaps, 711 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) 41 
State v. Humphries, 818 F. 2d 1027 (Utah 1991) 6 
State v. Lopez, 886 P. 2d 1105 (Utah 1994) 6 
State v. Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484 28 
State v. Davis, 965 F. 2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 6 
State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991) 43 
State v. Thureman, 846 F. 2d 1256 (Utah 1983) 18 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 29 
State v. Wetzel, 868 F. 2d 64 (Utah 1983) 18 
State v. Hoffine, 2001 Ut. 4 (Ut. 2001) 17 
State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002) 25 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 26 
v 
Murdoch v. Farrell, 163 P. 1102 (Utah 1917) 41 
State v. Gram, 46 F. 3d 230 (Utah 2002) 6 
State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 42 
State v. Ramirez, 817 F. 2d 774 (Ut. 1991) 16 
State v. Thomas, 830 F. 2d 243 (Utah 1992) 6 
State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 3 
State v. Potter, 627 F. 2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981) 6 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) 27 
State v. Smith, 706 F. 2d 1052, 1058 (Utah 1985) 6 
State v. Payner, 964 F. 2d 327, 333 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 6 
State v.Jarman, 987 F. 2d 1284 (Utah 1999) 7, 11 
State v. Bluff, 52 F. 3d 1210 (Utah 2002) 6 
State v. Bryant, 965 F. 2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 18-19 
State v. Haston, 811 F. 2d 929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. \99\) 6 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, at 268 (Utah 1985) 33 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 39 
U.S. v. Forker, 928 F. 2d 365, 369 (11th Cir. 1991) 12 
US. v. Martin, 806 F. 2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1986) 12 
U.S. v. Marking, 1 F. 3d 1309, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993) 12 
U.S. v. Ford, 986 F. 2d 57, 60 (4th Cir. 1993) 13 
U.S. v. Franks, 864 F. 2d 992, 1001 (3rd Cir. 1998) 38 
U.S. v. Large, 183 F. 3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999) 13 
vi 
U.S. v.Marshall, 986 F. 2d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1983) 13 
US. v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993) 35 
US. v.Johnson, 820 F. 2d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1987) 13 
U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115-21 37 
U.S. v. Blaze, 143 F. 3d 585, 592 (10th Cir. 1998) 13 
U.S. v. Khouny, 901 F. 2d 948, 957-60 (10th Cir. 1998) 13 
US. v. Thompson, 29 F. 3d 62, 66 (2nd Cir. 1994) 13 
US. v. Castro, 129 F. 3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1997) 13 
U.S. v. Rodriguez; Morales, 929 F. 2d 780-787 (1st Cir. 1991) 13 
U.S. v. Decker, 19 F. 3d 287, 289 (6th Cir. 1994) 13 
U.S. v.Frank, 864F.2d992, 1001 (3rd Cir. 1998) 14 
U.S. v. Bilanzich, 111 F.2d292, 296 (7th Cir. 1985) 27 
U.S. v. Lage, 183 F. 3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999) 37 
U.S. v. Reed, 26 F. 3d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1994) 12 
U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 1-12 (1977) 12 
U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974) 27 
U.S. v.Hood, 183 F. 3d, 744-745 (8th Cir. 1999) 12 
U.S. v.Khoury, 901 F. 2d 948, 957-60 (11th Cir. 1990) 37 
U.S. v.Bulcan, 156 F. 3d 963-968-973-974 (9th Cir. 1998; 11 
U.S. v. Salina - Cano, 959 P.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1992) 27 
US. v. Cohen, 796 F. 2d 20 (2nd Cir. 6/30/1986) 9 
U.S. v.Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 115-21 (1984) 13 
vii 
U.S. v. Monger, 185 F.3d574, 578 (6th Cir. 1999) 6 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) 8 
1 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter because this case has been 
transferred from the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2~2-(4) (1953, as 
amended). 
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 
ISSUE I: Did the District Court fail to give proper jury, specifically by not 
presenting a lesser included offense? 
(Raised below: See R. at 801, 803; Trial Transcript (Record pp. 
1255-1258) (hereafter "Tr.") at 917.) 
ISSUE II: Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion for Mistrial 
because comments by trial judge were improper and denied the Defendant 
the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury? 
(Raised below: See Tr. at 59-60.) 
ISSUE III: Did the Court err in not suppressing the suppress evidence from trunk of 
an automobile in which the methamphetamine lab central to this case was 
discovered based on defective third-party consent? 
(Raised below: See R. at 1259, p. 123-124 (defense counsel 
bringing out on cross-examination of searching officer, in hearing 
on motion to suppress, that third parties, to whom the evidence in 
the trunk did not belong, rather than the Defendant gave the 
consent to search box in trunk), and p. 162 (counsel pointing out, 
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inter alia, the box belonged to the Defendant and he had an 
expectation of privacy in it, in making his argument the the 
evidence found therein should be suppressed). 
ISSUE IV: Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
evidence seized from the Purgatory Correctional Facility and from the St. 
George impound lot? 
(Raised below: R. at 12-13, 204, 1259) 
ISSUE V: Did the District Court err in denying the Defendant's Motion in Limine 
and allowing eye witness testimony which was tainted and unreliable? 
(See Tr. at 635.) 
(Raised below: R. at 635-637). 
ISSUE VI: Did the District Court err in allowing a jail "kite" or letter (trial exhibit 
#28) into evidence, where there was insufficient foundation to allow the 
letter into evidence? 
(Raised below: Transcript of Trial (R. 1257) at 491-493, 507. 
ISSUE VII: Did the District Court err in disallowing certain testimony from defense 
witness Mr. Paul Halstead, on the basis of hearsay; and the testimony of 
defense witness Mr. Troy Thode, on the basis of hearsay and on the basis 
that it was too collateral to the issues at trial? 
(Raised below: Tr. at 673-679; 752 to 753.) 
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Standards of Review 
The standard of review for Issue I: Whether the trial court properly refused to 
give requested instructions to a jury is a matter reviewed for correctness. State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 
924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court formulated a two-part analysis for determining whether to grant 
a defendant's request for jury instructions on a lesser included offense. 
First, the court must compare the statutory elements of the crimes and 
determine whether the elements overlap. See id. Second, it must 
determine whether a rational basis exists on which the jury could 
acquit the defendant of the offense charged while convicting him of 
the alternative offense. See id. 
State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added). 
The standard of review for Issue II: Rulings on motions for mistrial are reviewed 
for abuse of discretion and this standard is met only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result for the defendant. For purposes of determining whether a mistrial should have been 
granted, our overriding concern is that defendant receive a fair trial. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 
262, 276 (Utah 1998). 
The standard of review for Issue III and IV: "A trial court's findings underlying its 
decision to grant or deny a Motion to Suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, 
and it's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness." State v. Jarman, 9987 P. 2d 1284. 
The standard of review for Issue V, VI, and VII: Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, although the application of legal standards in those rulings is reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., State v. Wetzel 868 F. 2d 64 (Utah 1983); State v. Thurman. 846 F. 2d 
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1256 (Utah 1993); Comcoa. Inc. v. Nee Tel's. Inc.. 931 F. 2d 655 (10th Cir. 1991); Orthv. 
Emerson Elec. Co.. 980 F. 2d 632, (10th Cir. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal action against Defendant for one count of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION 
OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES, as enhanced to a first-degree felony under 
U.C.A 58-37d-4 (1953, as amended). 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Trial of the above-referenced matter was conducted on October 22, 2001 to October 25, 
2001 on the instant charges. See Record Transcripts of Jury Trial, with each transcript volume 
given record numbers, to wit: 1255, 1256, 1257, and 1258; the pagination of the Jury Trial 
transcripts runs consecutively throughout the several volumes (hereafter jury trial transcripts will 
be cited as "Tr." with page numbering from the consecutive pagination indicated thereafter). At 
the Preliminary Hearing evidence was presented and the Defendant was bound over for trial. See 
R. at 55-57, 60, 71. Trial by jury was then held on the above-mentioned dates. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The Defendant was convicted at trial, and originally Judgment, according to the jury 
verdict, was pronounced against Defendant and on December 3, 2001. R. at 854-55. Defendant 
was sentenced by the trial court to a five-to-life prison term in the Utah State Prison. On 
December 20, 2001, a signed Judgment, Commitment, and Sentence was entered. R. at 868-870. 
On February 8, 2002, an amended judgment was entered, which stated that Defendant had been 
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convicted of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies and that the conviction 
had been enhanced to a first-degree felony. R. at 955-958. On March 18, 2005, a Second 
Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment was entered by the Court, which also sentenced 
Defendant to a five-to-life term in the Utah State Prison. See Record at 1483-1486. A Notice of 
Appeal was filed on March 22, 2005. R. at 1489-1488. 
P. Statement of Facts 
Facts Regarding Issue I: 
The Defendant in this case submitted to the Court at trial, but the District Court 
disallowed, the following proposed instruction ("Instruction No. A"), which set forth the 
instructions as to what elements were necessary to convict Defendant on the charge of Unlawful 
Possession of Laboratory Equipment and Supplies, also gave the jury the option of convicting 
Defendant of a lesser included offense, that of Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a 
class A misdemeanor; the trial judge refused to include this jury instruction. The proposed 
instruction read as follows: 
Before you may find Defendant TERRY ARNOLD MESSER guilty 
of the offense of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or 
Supplies, a as charged in the Information, the State must prove and 
you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and 
every one of the following elements: 
1. That the Defendant acted knowingly and intelligently; 
2. That the Defendant did: 
(a) possess laboratory equipment and supplies 
with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
methamphetamine laboratory operation; or 
(b) possess a controlled substance precursor with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine 
methamphetamine laboratory operation; and 
3. That such acts occurred on or about January 14,1999, 
through January 21, 1999, in Iron County, State of 
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Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the 
previously described elements, you must find the Defendant not guilty 
of the offense of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or 
Supplies, as charged in the Information. If the State has proved, 
however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your 
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find 
the Defendant guilty of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory 
Equipment or Supplies, as charged in the Information. 
In the event that you find the Defendant not guilty of Unlawful 
Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, you should 
disregard the balance of this Instruction and proceed to the next 
numbered Jury Instruction which deals with Possession of a 
Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A misdemeanor. 
If you find that the Defendant is guilty of Unlawful Possession of 
Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, as charged in the Information, 
then and only then should you consider whether or not said acts took 
place under the following conditions, to wit: 
(a) The Defendant illegally possessed, 
transported, or disposed of hazardous or 
dangerous material while transporting, or 
causing to be transported, materials in 
furtherance of a clandestine laboratory 
operation, that created a substantial risk to 
human health or safety or danger to the 
environment. 
(b) The intended methamphetamine laboratory operation 
took place within 500 feet of a residence. 
(c) Said clandestine laboratory operation was for the 
production of methamphetamine base. 
If, [sic] you find the Defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
you find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the 
special conditions exist, then you should so indicate on the special 
verdict form provided with these instructions. 
R. at 803 (emphasis added). 
Because the trial judge refused to include the lesser included offense language in the first 
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instruction, he likewise did not include the following instruction ("Instruction No. B") on the 
elements of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A misdemeanor: 
Before you may find Defendant TERRY ARNOLD MESSER guilty of the offense 
of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A misdemeanor, 
a lesser included charge of the one charged in the Information, the State must prove 
and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one 
of the following elements: 
1. That the Defendant acted knowingly and intelligently; 
2. That the Defendant did: 
(a) obtain or attempt to obtain or possess any 
controlled substance precursor, and 
(b) the Defendant knew or had reasonable cause 
to believe that the controlled substance 
precursor was intended to be used in the 
unlawful manufacture of any controlled 
substance, and 
3. That such acts occurred on or about January 14,1999, 
through January 21, 1999, in Iron County, State of 
Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the 
previously described elements, you must find the Defendant not guilty 
of the offense of a Controlled Substance Precursor [sic]. 
If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the 
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A 
misdemeanor. 
R. at 801. 
The reasoning behind the judge's refusal is preserved on the record. The trial judge, in 
justifying his refusal, gave the following explanation: 
The court, in analyzing the evidence and testimony that came before 
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this jury, first of all, form the state's witnesses, the expert witnesses, 
the chemist who analyzed the material seized from the trunk of the 
blue Corsica, did not elicit, in any form, any weight of controlled 
substance precursors. We had no weight of iodine crystals, no weight 
of phosphorous of any kind, and no weight of ephedrine. The only 
evidence of the presence of iodine crystals in an amount sufficient to 
meet the 12-ounce statutory threshold under the statute, as it exists 
now and as it existed back in 1999, was the evidence offered by Mr. 
Messer himself indicating that the witness, Karen Hardy, displayed 
to him a 1 gallon ziplock bag containing his, in his estimate, 2 pounds 
of what he described as iodine crystals. That testimony was 
independent and separate from any of the supporting testimony 
whatsoever. The only logical inference that the court can have 
regarding the source of iodine crystals for these parties is the 
reduction by evaporation of tincture of iodine purchased 
from Overson's Farm Supply and from Intermountain Farmers. 
The testimony was clear, a total of five gallons, one from 
Intermountain Farmers at maximum. And there was some conflict 
there, may be none, from Intermountain Farmers, and four or five 
from Overson's. Mr. Messer is the only person who testified that 
there was five. Mr. Overson testified that that was a 7 percent 
solution of tincture of iodine. A 1 gallon plastic bag containing 
only the iodine from that many gallons of 7 percent solution would 
not possibly have the volume described by Mr. Messer. And I have 
no idea as to the weight because my chemistry is way too old to 
remember the atomic weight of iodine or the potential weight of a 
gallon of this tincture, therefore, I'm not giving it. 
Tr. at 914. 
Immediately after the judge's statement, the following interchange between Mr. Scarth, 
counsel for Defendant, and the trial judge, took place: 
MR. SCARTH: The only thing is regards to your findings, 
Your honor, is you stated that Mr. Messer's 
testimony was that Karen Hardy displayed the 
crystalline iodine to him. But his testimony 
was in fact that he handled it. 
THE COURT: That's correct, counsel. He did testify that he 
handled it. And feeling, that wonderful 
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phrase that he did not use, but I will use, the 
heft thereof, estimated it at 2 pounds, but 
that's the only testimony that we have on the 
issue. 
Tr.at916. 
Facts Regarding Issue II: 
In his introductory comments to the jury, the Court stated: 
Right now, our system of government, our way of life is under 
assault. And it's good people like you who stand up and support it. 
Tr. at 54. 
Trial Counsel moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied without explanation or 
justification. See Tr. at 59-60. 
Facts Regarding Issue III; 
During the investigation into Defendant's purported methamphetamine lab, Officer Kelly 
Edwards of the Cedar City Police Department went to the home of Tim Hasch because of 
suspected illegal activity on Mr. Hasch's property (Tr. at 430). Also present at Mr. Hasch's home 
with Officer Edwards were David Excell, Mark Gower, and J.R. Robinson, and Keith Millett, all 
of whom are peace officers (Tr. at 372). Officer Edwards testified that he asked Mr. Hasch is he 
could look at the contents inside a car on Mr. Hasch's property and Mr. Hasch gave consent to 
the search (Tr. at 431). According to Officer Edward's Testimony, Mr. Hasch retrieved a key to 
the car and opened up the car trunk where Officer Edwards testified to seeing a bag that he 
suspected contained a methamphetamine lab (Tr. at 431). Officer Edwards testified that he 
believed that the bag and purported methamphetamine lab did not belong to Mr. Hasch because 
Mr. Hasch had in fact informed Officer Edwards that it was not his. Mr. Hasch also testified at 
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trial that the meth lab in the trunk of the car was not his, that he had never used it, and had never 
seen it before (Tr. at 438). Officer Millett testified that when the trunk of the car was opened he 
saw two suitcases, a duffel bag, and a backpack (Tr. at 374). Officer Millet also testified that he 
believed that Officer Excell photographed the "stuff in the trunk and then "opened it up briefly 
just to see what it contained' (Tr. at 374, emphasis added). 
Mr. Hasch was the one that gave the consent upon which the officers relied, for the search 
of the contents of the trunk, even though Mr. Hasch made clear those items did not belong to him 
and belonged instead to the Defendant. See R. at 1259, p. 123-124 There was no assertion that 
the Defendant gave consent to the search of his private bags. See id., passim. 
Facts Regarding Issue IV: 
On January 21, 1999, Detective Mark Gower, Commander David Excell, and then-
agent Keith Millett followed Defendant's vehicle southbound on Interstate 15 from Cedar 
City to La Verkin, Utah (Tr. at 101). Detective Gower continued to follow Defendant's 
vehicle southbound toward Hurricane, Utah and later observed Ms. Karen Hardy walking 
with Defendant's car stopped a short distance away from Ms. Hardy's location. 
Defendant was identified as the driver of the car and arrested. Defendant's vehicle was 
impounded and subsequently inventoried. In speaking with Ms. Hardy, Detective Gower 
learned that a "boxed" methamphetamine lab was being stored on the property of Tim 
Hasch (Tr. 104-105). Later in the evening Detective Gower responded to the Hasch 
residence and, with the assistance of Mr. Hasch, discovered the boxed lab in the trunk of 
a car parked on Mr. Hasch's property. The key to open the trunk was provided by Mr. 
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Hasch, who informed Detective Gower that Defendant possessed another key to the same 
trunk (Tr. 105). 
Detective Gower then returned to the Purgatory Correctional Facility in 
Washington County, Utah, to examine the items taken from Defendant when he was 
booked into jail (Tr. 106). Detective Gower located a key withing this property that later 
opened the trunk of the vehicle containing the boxed lab (Tr. 107). 
Upon further examination of the trunk, Detective Gower located two suitcases, a 
duffle bag, and a backpack (Tr. 108). After conducting an inventory of the items located 
within the suitcases and bags, Detective Gower notice these were items consistent with 
clandestine manufacturing of methamphetamines (Tr. 111). 
At a hearing held on August 23, 2001, the Court accepted the proffer of 
Defendant's testimony as follows: (1) That at the Washington County Jail on January 21, 
1999, after Defendant's booking inventory of his personal belongings was complete, 
Defendant saw a man named Brett Rasmussen, who was an acquaintance of Defendant, 
and requested the booking deputy to release Defendant's personal property to Mr. 
Rasmussen. The deputy refused the request.(2) Thereafter, a detective examined 
Defendant's personal property at the jail and seized certain items for evidentiary 
purposes. (3) That on February 2, 1999, police officers went to the St. George Police 
impound lot and, without a warrant, seized a walkie-talkie/two-way radio box from 
Defendant's car. (Tr. 106-111) 
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Facts Regarding Issue V: 
The district court failed to limit Larry J. Overson's identification testimony at trial 
(Tr. at 635). 
At the preliminary hearing on this matter Mr. Overson identified Defendant as one 
of the two persons who purchased iodine in his store on January 14, 1999 (Tr. 8-10). 
However, Mr. Overson's identification of Defendant was not only assisted by 
Defendant being seated at the defense counsel's table and attired in prison garb, but was 
also prompted to give his identification by a leading question by the state prosecutor. 
The prosecutor asked Mr. Overson the following question: "Is one of the individuals that 
you saw on January 14th in your store seated at the table on my left?" 
Therefore, as a result of the prosecutor essentially pointing out Defendant to the 
witness for the purposes of identification, Mr. Overson's identification is forever tainted. 
Mr. Overson could also not identify or recall seeing another person (Karen Hardy) 
who had earlier been in the court room for the preliminary hearing, and who, in fact, had 
been the person who actually purchased the iodine in question directly from Mr. Overson 
(Tr.6, 11). 
Facts Regarding Issue VI: 
At trial the State introduced, with the Defense's objection being overruled, a jail "kite" or 
letter purported to have been written by the Defendant, which contained incriminating statements 
which the State utilized as evidence that Defendant was attempting to convey to a co-defendant 
his encouragement that they stick together and not cut a deal with the State, and suggesting to the 
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co-defendant that she get the key to the box holding the methamphetamine lab so, purportedly, 
evidence could be taken and/or destroyed. See Trial Exhibit #28; R. at 983 p. 18-19. 
The Defense objected for lack of foundation, and the Court overruled the objection. The 
Court stated that the only foundation for the letter was the testimony of a co-defendant who 
indicated she could recognize the handwriting as the Defendant's handwriting. See R. 1257, p. 
520 (Court states: " . . . It is the identity of this, lay identification of that handwriting as Mr. 
Messer's, which is the sole basis for the court's admission of it."). 
Facts Regarding Issue VII: 
The Defense sought at trial to have Mr. Paul Halstead, who had been a cell mate of 
State's witness, Mr. Ervin Hasch, testify that Ervin Hasch, was attempting to pin the 
methamphetamine lab on Mr. Messer rather than having to answer for it himself. See Tr. at 675-
76. The Court did not allow this testimony based on the determination that it was hearsay and on 
the fact that the Defense did not reveal the Defense's intention to put on this hearsay testimony to 
the State until a point during the trial. The Court determined it could not come in, due to this 
lack of notice, and the Court cited Utah Rules of Evidence 803(24). Id. 
The Defense also sought at trial to put on testimony from bail bondsman Troy Thode 
regarding a woman he'd previously bailed out of jail, State's witness Karen Hardy. See Tr. at 
748-756. The testimony in question, which was not allowed by the Court, was that Ms. Hardy 
had been bailed out by him, and had secured the transaction with some jewelry and two vehicles; 
and that the vehicles, when the bondsman went to tow them to hold them, were gone; and that the 
jewelry turned out to be reportedly stolen from another State's witnesses' (Todd Farnsworth's) 
house; and that she had jumped bail. See id. The Court did not allow this testimony, on the basis 
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that it was "impeachment in a far too collateral issue." See id. at 752. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I: The District Court failed to give proper jury instructions by not giving the jury 
a choice of a lesser included offense. The jury should have been given the opportunity to convict 
on the lesser included offense. 
ISSUE II: The District Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion for Mistrial because 
comments by trial judge were improper and denied the Defendant the right to a fair trial before an 
impartial jury. The comments made by the Court at the outset of the trial were inappropriate and 
set a tone which was not impartial and in line with the presumption of innocence, but which 
rather set a tone that the juror's duty was to convict. 
ISSUE III: The Court erred in not suppressing evidence found in a trunk which was 
searched based on invalid third-party consent. The items found in the trunk were identified by 
the third party as not belonging to him, and yet law enforcement searched them based on the third 
party's consent. 
ISSUE IV: The District Court failed to suppress the illegally of obtained evidence by the 
police seizure of Defendant's personal property without consent or a search warrant at the 
Purgatory Jail after the booking inventory search was completed, violating the Defendant's U.S. 
and Utah Constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The District Court 
also failed to suppress the illegally obtained evidence by the police seizure of personal property 
from the Defendant's car at the police impound lot some twelve (12) days after the impound and 
inventory search again without consent or a search warrant, which violated the Defendant's U.S. 
14 
and Utah Constitutional protected rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
ISSUE V: The District Court failed to limit Larry J. Oversons' identification testimony at 
trial. During the preliminary hearing Mr. Oversons' identification of the Defendant was unduly 
influences, and the objectivity thereof corrupted, not only by the Defendant being seated at 
Defense Counsel's table an attired in prison garb, but further with the leading question of the 
Prosecutor. The Prosecutor asked Mr. Oversons the following question, "Is one of the individuals 
that you say on January 14th in your store seated at the table to my left?" Therefor, as a result to 
the Prosecutor practically pointing to the Defendant, Mr. Oversons' identification of the 
defendant is forever tainted. Therefore the admittance of the tainted witness testimony violated 
the Defendant's U.S. and Utah Constitutional right to a fair trial. 
ISSUE VI: The District Court erred in admitting a letter/kite (Trial Exhibit #28) into 
evidence because there was insufficient foundation to allow the letter into evidence, which 
violated the Defendant's right to a fair trial. 
ISSUE VII: The District Court erred in disallowing the testimony of defense witness Mr. 
Paul Haulstead on the basis of Hearsay, and the testimony of Mr. Troy Thode on the basis of it 
being too collateral to the issues at trial. Both rulings denied the defendant due process and 




THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO GIVE PROPER JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS BY NOT GIVING THE JURY A CHOICE OF A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
Whether the trial court properly refused to give requested instructions to a jury is a matter 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152,159 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court formulated a two-part analysis for determining whether to grant 
a defendant's request for jury instructions on a lesser included offense. 
First, the court must compare the statutory elements of the crimes and 
determine whether the elements overlap. See id. Second, it must 
determine whether a rational basis exists on which the jury could 
acquit the defendant of the offense charged while convicting him of 
the alternative offense. See id. 
State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added).7 
The Court disallowed a lesser included jury instruction in this case, as wet forth in the 
Statement of Facts above. Defendant's proposed instruction in this regard set forth the instructions 
as to what elements were necessary to convict Defendant on the charge of Unlawful Possession of 
Laboratory Equipment and Supplies, but also gave the jury the option of convicting Defendant of 
a lesser included offense, that of Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A 
misdemeanor; the trial judge refused to include this jury instruction. 
1
 See also U.S. v. Monger. 185 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 1999) (New trial granted 
because district court's refusal to instruct the jury on lesser offense of simple possession is 
intrinsically harmful constitutional error); State v. Payne. 964 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998); Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-503; State v. Bluff. 52 P.3d 1210 
(Utah 2002): State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991): State v. Smith. 706 
P.2d 1052, 1058 (Utah 1985); State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). 
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Because the trial judge refused to include the lesser included offense language in the first 
instruction, he likewise did not include the Defendant's proposed instruction ("Instruction No. B") 
on the elements of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor, a class A 
misdemeanor. See Statement of Facts above. 
Applying the Baker test cited above to the reasoning of the Court, as set forth above in the 
Statement of Facts, it is evident that the trial judge erred in refusing to give the jury the option of 
convicting Defendant on the lesser included offense. In analyzing the two statutes at issue, U.C.A. 
§58-37d-4 (1953, as amended) (Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies) and 
U.C.A. §58-37c-10(k) (1953, as amended) (Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
Precursor), it is clear that the elements of the two crimes overlap. One of the two elements necessary 
to convict a Defendant of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, and included 
in the jury instructions as presented to the jury, is that the Defendant "possess a controlled substance 
precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation." R. at 
826. The statute associated with the lesser included offense of Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance Precursor reads defines unlawful conducts as 
obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess any controlled 
substance precursor or any combination of controlled substance 
precursor or any combination of controlled substance precursors 
knowing or having a reasonable cause to believe that the controlled 
substance precursor is intended to be used in the unlawful 
manufacture of any controlled substance. 
U.C.A. 58-37c-10(k) (1953, as amended). Both crimes require the element of possessing a 
controlled substance with the intent of using the controlled substance precursor to illegally produce 
a controlled substance. The second prong of the Baker test is the determination whether a rational 
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basis existed that would allow the jury to acquit the Defendant of the offense charged while finding 
him guilty of the lesser included offense. Such a rational scenario existed in the instant case, 
therefore, the lesser included offense instruction should have been given. 
Addressing what constitutes a rational basis on which a jury may rely the Baker court further 
said: 
One of the foundational principles in regard to the submission of 
issues to juries is that where the parties so request they are entitled 
to have instructions given upon their theory of the case; and this 
includes on lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the evidence 
would support such a verdict 
State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 154 (Utah 1983). Utah statutory law also states that unless a 
rational basis for conviction of a lesser included offense exists a trial judge need not give a lesser 
included instruction to the jury. U.C. A. 76-1-402(4) (1953, as amended). 
[T]he court is obligated to instruct on the lesser offense only if the 
evidence offered provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense." This standard does not require the court to 
weigh the credibility of the evidence, a function reserved for the 
trier of fact. The court must only decide whether there is a 
sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify sending the 
question to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning all 
jury instructions in any trial. When the elements of two offenses 
overlap as discussed in the previous paragraph, if there is a 
sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question regarding a 
lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury regarding the 
lesser offense. Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous and 
therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one 
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and 
conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must 
give a lesser included offense instruction at the request of the 
defendant. This situation will often arise when the critical question 
is either the credibility of certain evidence or the determination of 
what inferences may legitimately be made on the basis of the 
evidence. By assessing the evidence and deciding whether any 
interpretation of it would, if believed by the jury, permit conviction 
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of the lesser offense and acquittal of the greater, the court preserves 
the weighing of evidence for the jury but is still able to protect the 
weighing process from frivolous "red herrings." 
Male v. Baku 'i ' : --ml case the urn* : : \ h ' e vr-r- * - v u 
refused to send the question of a lesser included offense to the jury because he did not t>ehe\ e 
there was a "quantum ' of evidenc e to sei id the question to the ji it: } I here ai e multiple i easons 
pointing to the j u d u e s error in this matter. 
First, it is evident from the record that the trial judge relied on an erroneous 
determination. As noted :iho\ e, the trial judge staled that die only eA idenee ot the presence < »f 
iodine crystals in an amoum .:.:• ,:<....:» »i:ces !. . -ounce statutorv *:.:. ii.r .«:..; ;e:,uu:.te 
was the Defendant 's testimony that he Had held a bag ol "crystalline iodine that weighed about 2 
pounds (Tr at 915) . The trial judge further stated that " h 1 1 gallon plastic bag containing only 
• • • • , ^ - • ^ ••• *-
ii-;: is • - • »ossibly lia;\ re th 3 \ oh in l 3 
claimed h\ the Defendant (Tr. at 915). 
.».:... inresholu )i amount i indei the stati ite is not I: \ v eh e ounces it Is only two 
ounces ];.( \, § 5b J 7 C - 19{2)(ti) (1953, as amended). Therefore, the trial judge, in making his 
initiai ihrcshold determination as to the existence of a quantum,., ofevi.den.ee on which to support a 
verdit " • - : ! r » - -.u ::•.-!: j / ; :• j 
did not believe that the Defendant s estimate ol the weiuhi *M 'he crystal iodine toulu »• as imu h 
been able to believe that the bag did in fact contain at least two o u n c ^ of crystalline iodine-an 
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amount that would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. However, because of the 
judge's erroneous belief, we do not know how he would have ruled if he would have had the 
correct statutory figure in mind. Therefore, because of the Court's error, a new trial should be 
held in order to properly rule on the issue with the correct legal standards being applied. 
Second, the judge improperly discounted the importance of the Defendant's own 
testimony in conjunction with his possession of crystalline iodine. It appears from the record that 
the judge believed that the Defendant's own testimony was not sufficient to support the claim 
that he had in fact violated the Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor statute. 
The trial judge stated that Defendant's testimony as to possession of the crystalline iodine "was 
independent and separate from any of the supporting testimony whatsoever. The only logical 
inference that the court can have regarding the source of iodine crystals for these parties is the 
reduction by evaporation of tincture of iodine purchased from Overson's Farm Supply and from 
Intermountain Farmers." Tr. at 915. 
While the Defendant may have been the only witness to testify as to the weight of the 
crystalline iodine in the plastic bag, his testimony is still relevant and just as competent as any 
other witness'. Further, it is irrelevant what the source of the crystalline iodine was; whether it 
originated from the iodine allegedly purchased from Overson's Farm Supply or Intermountain 
Farmers it not the issue. In order to find the Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense the 
Defendant would have to (1) obtain or attempt to obtain or possess any controlled substance 
precursor, and (2) know or have reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance 
precursor was intended to be used in the unlawful manufacture of any controlled substance, and 
(3) the Defendant would had to have possessed the controlled substance precursor between the 
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dates of January 1 1, 1999 and January 21, 1999 I he origin of the methamphetaniine •— • > 
consequence, 
Bj his o"\;\ lit. testimon> , tl le Defendant did, in fact, possess the bag of crystalline iodine; he 
also testified to lib weight n\\ o pounds), which satisfied the minimum weight of two ounces 
under the statute (Tv A 7lO» I nis satisfies the first element of the offense. 
used in the unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. The record is replete \w\- eferences 
to both the Defendant' s involvement in the pi\ ^ u i.vr. . -; methamphe1a;».;:u 
5 77). Ihe record also reflects the fact that the individual noni whom the Defendant got the bag 
of crvstallrx iodine This then-^iflftiend. Karen Hardy) also claimed to know U*w u p H1U,,-„ 
• *•- i - ^ M- •*. • i c t i c e ' •" • -. . : 
to reduce i m its crystalline lorn: outside of some prolessional or educational setting ?b 
vr(n),i.u\ Mspu ious enough in anu o! itself u> give a person a reasonable belief that the precursor 
would be used in the unlawful production of a controlled substance; coupled with "the intimate 
knowledge of methamphetamine production, there is only one reasonable belief as Ie v. \\i 
i • * = . * ! • • • -
could belies e that the I )eteiulant himself wa^ (he individual w ho intended to use the erxstalhne 
iodine for the production of a controlled substance. I he second element o\ UK ;esser inclu*;.. 
offense is satisfied. 
The third element, important for the purposes of the trial, was that the offense took: place 
testified that he possessed the methamphetamine on Januuiy 1:-, HW (l'i. at 789). 
Next, the jury's own verdict suggests that the jury actually believed that the Defendant 
possessed controlled substance precursors. The jury, in addressing the enhancements did in fact 
find the Defendant guilty of actually operating a clandestine laboratory for the production of 
methamphetamine base. The purpose of the law against the possession of controlled substance 
precursors is undoubtedly to stem the production of controlled substances. The threshold 
amounts indicated in the statutes for various precursors evidently indicate minimum levels for 
the production of methamphetamine. It is only logical that if the Defendant actually operated the 
lab in order to produce methamphetamine that he would have had to have possessed controlled 
substance precursors in at least the minimum threshold amount contemplated by statute. It is 
unlikely that the legislature contemplated that possession of a controlled substance precursor was 
okay so long as the person with the precursor was only going to make "a little" 
methamphetamine. By the jury's very own verdict it is clear that the evidence could have 
supported a conviction of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor. 
Further, at the time of Defendant's arrest, tincture iodine was not mentioned on the list of 
controlled substance precursors found in U.C.A. § 58-37c-3 (1953) (amended 2000). However, 
tincture iodine, in concentrations greater than 1.5%, was added to the list in 2000, one year after 
the Defendant was arrested. Crystalline iodine, ephedrine, and pseudoephedrine were only added 
to the list in 1998, one year prior to the Defendant's arrest. Nevertheless, nowhere in the state 
does it state that the list of controlled substance precursors is intended to be an exclusive list of 
controlled substance precursors and their various forms. Therefore, since tincture iodine is 
obviously a controlled substance precursor, having that status laid out in statutory language in 
Utah since 2000, the Defendant should have been able to be convicted on Unlawful Possession of 
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a Controlled Substance Precursoi noioiiiy because ofhis pi.- w..-- j . 'v^ ; 1 ! iK ; *• • . but 
also because of his alleged possession of "a seven percent soluiion of tincture iodine. 
The argument that tl: i,e pi ecui soi list is necessaril} exhausti v e and exclusi\ e because of 
due process and notice concerns falls when applied. Theoretically, an individual could break the 
law by possessing a controlled substance precursor not listed in the statute and claim a violation 
precursor, Fhis argument ot due process violation breaks down as soon as the necessary element 
to the crime- intern ,.-. miftKk :^t.. • ..... ; v ^ow n that the individual haU „,, mtent to produce 
a controlled substance and was, in fact, engaged in using the unlisted precursor substance to that 
ciul then that person cannot rationally arpu ihat he or she did not have notice that the material 
It is also seemingly incongruous with the evident ieui -;.in\ C intent ot nu- stat*.-t-. U) rontrol 
the rising tide of illegal methamphetamine production to say that crystalline iodine is illegal, but 
tincture iodine, purchased and possessed for the very purpose and intent of producing crystal 
iodine, is not illegal Similarly, an individual with a clear design and intent to produce 
\ei v p irpose of ext'a«.:iuig the phosphorous lot ihe nroduci.oi I methamphetamine. in doing so 
• \ ,:cw j : v remain within the boundaries of the law up uni. J>c time he engages in the 
process of extracting the phosphorous from the matchboxes, because matchboxes are not on the 
list of precursors. Huvwvu, it is surely not the nature and purpose of the law U protect drug 
pi oducers J i 11 J icn u< n v ; c 11 \ H n n u «, ;» i substance preci lrsoi is illegal in \ hatevei form it takes \v hen 
the intent to use it to produce methamphetamine is present. 
The record is abundant with references to Defendant's connection with and possession of 
tincture iodine (Tr. at 62, 529). The jury could easily have convicted the Defendant on the charge 
of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance Precursor based on the Defendant's alleged 
possession of tincture iodine, had the jury been given the choice. 
Based on the foregoing and reviewed for correctness, it is evident that the trial judge in 
this case erred by not including the jury instruction for a lesser included offense. Therefore, the 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
ISSUE II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
MISTRIAL BECAUSE COMMENTS BY TRIAL JUDGE WERE IMPROPER AND 
DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY. 
In his introductory comments to the jury, the Court stated: 
Right now, our system of government, our way of life is under 
assault. And it's good people like you who stand up and support it. 
Tr. at 54. 
Trial Counsel moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied without explanation or 
justification. See Tr. at 59-60. 
Rulings on motions for mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion and this standard is 
met only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant. For purposes of 
determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, our overriding concern is that 
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defen* : • ^ ' > ' . .mite v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 17(M Utah 1998).2 The 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah KMh guarantee Ihc 
right of a person accused of a cm: ime to a ti ial befoi e ai I "impai t ial ji ii ;; „" I I S CONS I , ai t I, § i •; 
UTAH CONST., art. I, § 12. 
In the instant case the trial judge made the following comment to the jurors after they had 
it's good people like you who stand up and ^I;>POM M./ •; na: \ r. ai *~; i 
:.. comment from the trial judge to the jury was hichiv inappropriate and j r .udu : 
inasmuch as it appeared that the judge was referencing criminal elements in societv \-.KC the 
Defendant thai arx threatening our way of life and. ::=ai ' was the jury's dutv to do something 
'»! tlu trial :hc iur\ ^ conditional to < o\\\ sJ K a judge s vommenl his is certainl} n. i M\ s/v 
of impartial jury that our Constitution contemplates. 
For this reason the conviction of the Defendant should be reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
ISSUE in 
THE PURPORTED METHAMPHETAMINE LAB CENTRAL TO THIS CASE WAS 
DISCOVERED IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS IT CAME 
ABOUT DUE TO INVALID THIRD-PARTY CONSENT. 
As stated with more detail in the Statement of I-'aus a bow*. < Mfleer fdwaaN ^ enr u* hi-
h :)iiie of I iiii I lasch because of suspected illegal activn> • >:. \\ ; u ^ n 1 s proper!', « .:' -^  . i ^; : 
2See also State v. Thomas. 830 P.2d 243 (Utah ! 002'}; Burton v. Zion'sCoop. Mercantile 
Inst.249 P.2d 514, 517 (I Jtah 1952); State v. Cram.. 46 |>A1 230 (Utah 2002). 
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testified that he asked Mr. Hasch is he could look at the contents inside a car on Mr. Hasch's 
property and Mr. Hasch gave consent to the search. According to Officer Edward's testimony, Mr. 
Hasch retrieved a key to the car and opened up the car trunk where Officer Edwards testified to 
seeing a bag that he suspected contained a methamphetamine lab. Officer Edwards testified that he 
believed that the bag and purported methamphetamine lab did not belong to Mr. Hasch because Mr. 
Hasch had in fact informed Officer Edwards that it was not his. Mr. Hasch also testified at trial that 
the meth lab in the trunk of the car was not his, that he had never used it, and had never seen it 
before. Officer Millett testified that when the trunk of the car was opened he saw two suitcases, a 
duffel bag, and a backpack. Officer Millet also testified that he believed that Officer Excell 
photographed the "stuff in the trunk and then "opened it up briefly just to see what it contained". 
Mr. Hasch was the one that gave the consent upon which the officers relied, for the search 
of the contents of the trunk, even though Mr. Hasch made clear those items did not belong to him 
and belonged instead to the Defendant. See R. at 1259, p. 123-124 There was no assertion that the 
Defendant gave consent to the search of his private bags. See id. .passim. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) provides us with the following 
discussion of the relevant rules of law: 
To address... [this] Fourth Amendment claim, we consider two lines 
of search and seizure jurisprudence, one dealing with execution of 
search warrants and the other dealing with consent to search. We first 
discuss the principles governing these interrelated areas of law, and 
then we apply these principles to the facts before us. 
The principles governing the execution of a search warrant are 
grounded in the purpose for such warrants. As a general rule, 
searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specific and well-
defined exceptions. A valid warrant authorizes the police to search 
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w\ :, „ilV4 -,VIK;J :i.c^ otncrw!.^ would have no right, and 
co;;>equently, the terms of the warrant dictate the scope of the 
officers' authority. A central purpose of the requirement of a warrant, 
issued under the authority of a neutral magistrate, is to protect 
against "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings" 
Dunn . / / l ^ r (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Since a warrant \\ as not obtained for the search, ihc officers rely upon the consent of Mr. 
I las*.,* U; v. *\ iaie ihv. ..ccv,. *\\
 x\ \ as ;a,»t 
in the trunk of the car. "Althou^upcibonha- » lesser expectation of pmaev inacas :' M> -n ins or 
herhome, one does not lose the protection oI i.,v l uu,ih Anio.tlment wliiie man autonuaaiv. state 
, \ .1 opez. 873 P 2< i 11 2 7 ( I lb ill . a: ^UKM Schlos>eu 774 P.2d 1132,1135 (Utah 1989); 
see State v. Hum. •*. MN P . J H>:< (Uah 1W1); State \ . Lopez. 886 P.?,1 H 0 r rT!al- < / v ^ \ 
• - ' - I . - % ' u i l l U l i. U l t i v . i A l l j ^ . - ' i - ' / S t v i l l C u S i . i l y > 
v. Salina - Cano. 959 P.2d bo, J : if W ^ i Therefore, the Defendant's claim ,a a pn\ac} 
interest is not, at the outset, negated - in ;av: mat m.^  hags were in the car. Moving on to the meat 
I he core jnquiiv tit a I ourtli Amendment a.ij, ,M:> I* wiiu • a 
person has a reasonable expectation of pri\ac\ in the area 
searched " United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Car. 
1985). "It is the right of possession rather than the right of 
ownership which ordinarily determines who may consent to a 
police search of a particular place." 3 Wayne R, LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 8.5(b) (2d ed. 1987). If a third party rather than the 
defendant consents to a search, the third party must he one who 
possesses "common authority" over the area or has some other" 
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to he 
inspected:' Id. § 8.5(c) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 171, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974)). The State bears 
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the burden of proving common authority, and it must do so by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177, 178 
n.14. 
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). 
Defendant's bags are obviously private places or personal effect as contemplated by this 
relevant language. This expectation of privacy triggers the warrant requirement. To argue that a 
man's luggage is a public place where he has no expectation of privacy in our society would be 
laughable and has been rejected by the Court. See State v. Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484; U.S. v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The Defendant obviously had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his own bags. 
Because the Defendant did not give consent to the search of his bags, the State must rely 
upon the consent of a third party to substitute for his consent. However, in this case, such third-
party consent was not valid. In any event, the State did not make a showing on the record that 
there was sufficient common authority to give rise to valid third-party consent. 
The Officers knew that the bag or bags in the trunk did not belong to Mr. Hasch and in 
fact did not believe that they belonged to Mr. Hasch. There is no indication of joint-ownership or 
control. 
At all times Mr. Hasch told investigating officers that the bags were not his. If the officers 
believed that the bags did not belong to Mr. Hasch, and at least one officer (Edwards) testified 
that he did not believe the bag to be Mr. Hasch's, then the officers could not in good faith assert 
that Mr. Hasch exercised common authority over the bags and thereby have the ability to consent 
to the search of Defendant's bags. Any consent by Mr. Hasch was ineffective to overcome the 
warrant requirement. Based on probable cause the officers could have obtained a warrant to 
search the bags, but the officers in this case failed to do so. Therefore, the opening of the bags 
without proper consent or a warrant constituted an illegal search and subsequent seizure of 
Defendant's bags. 
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\ \\ happened, Defendant's personal property was opened h\ ilnrd parties w i - .• h.ui .<o 
common authority over It, This is not acceptable under the law. 
contravention oi the l-ourth Amendment and subsequent!} used u> eon\ ict the ; j>eteihbni 
If the e'"\ idence were si ippressed from a ji n 3 it is possible that the • i.k«4ne of the trial may 
very well have been different, since the State would not liuv v ;ud arguably its most 
important evidence at trial. 
Defendant asks that Deft ndant's c " . be re \ ersedandi emanded f : 1 a n 2 w 
trial with the evidence from the car suppie^cd. 
ii the i iu.r; . uk , ihai tin* M ^  :.v -.iv \»a , ; ; i.ii^iociOo. ..tU. .; ^\as inciiecuve 
assisiauee of counsel u> not raise it. in Slate v. templm, oU5 P.id I X2. the court followed 
the analysis and decision result in Strickland v. Washington, 466 I S. K'«8 (1984) f M he 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Strickland, the Court set - *; ;> r \ • 
part test: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing the counsel' s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. 
Id. al 68 ; 
-Harder I* ii^.c\ ihc in--; pa;; • »! m^ lu>i u Jv.'ienU«i.ii nur-. identity the ue* - w( 
onn.^aons which, under the circumstances show that counsel's performance fell belo--
objective standard of reasonableness. First, in the instant case, if trial counsel did no 
sufficiently raise die third-party consent based ground^ t-.»r suppression, then he onnnitied 
a grounds to suppress the most potentially damning evidence n Hie State's possession, die 
! *!hjmphetamine lab materials. This omission cannot Minplv he attributed to a !actieai 
< t^on and there is sufficient information on the record suggesting that an attempt to 
^uppiess was absolutely warranted. By not moving to suppress the evidence found in the 
ear on Vli. 1 lasch's property, counsel for Defendant was deficient in his representation. 
Second, the Defendant was, in fact, prejudiced by the deficiency. A "fair trial" is not one 
.,, vviiicii evidence, especially key evidence, is obtained in contravention of the Fourth 
Amendment and subsequently u>ed u> dip. iet the Defendant. If the evidence were 
suppressed from a jury it is possible thai the outcome of the trial may very well have been 
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ISSUE IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY 
OBTAINED BY THE POLICE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL PROPERTY 
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT AT THE PURGATORY JAIL AFTER THE 
BOOKING INVENTORY SEARCH WAS COMPLETED, VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO FAILED TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE THAT 
WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED PURSUANT TO A POLICE SEIZURE OF 
PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE LOCATED AT THE 
POLICE IMPOUND LOT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE DAYS AFTER THE 
IMPOUND AND INVENTORY SEARCH. 
As stated more fully in the Statement of Facts above, Detective Gower and other 
law enforcement officials followed Defendant's vehicle on Interstate 15 and later 
observed Ms. Karen Hardy walking with Defendant's car stopped a short distance away 
from Ms. Hardy's location. Defendant was identified as the driver of the car and arrested. 
Defendant's vehicle was impounded and subsequently inventoried. 
In speaking with Ms. Hardy, Detective Gower learned that a "boxed" 
methamphetamine lab was being stored on the property of Tim Hasch. Later in the 
evening Detective Gower responded to the Hasch residence and, with the assistance of 
Mr. Hasch, discovered the boxed lab in the trunk of a car parked on Mr. Hasch's property. 
The key to open the trunk was provided by Mr. Hasch, who informed Detective Gower 
that Defendant possessed another key to the same trunk. 
Detective Gower then returned to the Purgatory Correctional Facility in 
Washington County, Utah, to examine the items taken from Defendant when he was 
booked into jai. He located a key withing this property that later opened the trunk of the 
vehicle containing the boxed lab. 
Upon further examination of the trunk, Detective Gower located two suitcases, a 
different, since the State would not have had its most important evidence at trial, the lab 
itself for which Defendant was convicted. 
30 
duffle bag, and a backpack. After conducting an inventory of the items located within the 
suitcases and baes. Detective (lower notice these were itenib consistent with clandestiiie 
mamiKiiu.niii! i.*: ;ucu;_:.fik r . .,-
\i \ hearing held on \ULHM 23. 2001. I1K Court accepted the proffer of 
Defe* : n k ' \s !' ron County Jail on J.'Mi::;1* 1, 
lW1). alter Defendant ^ houki;a; ;nvenioiv ol Ins persona! ftelougings was complex. 
Defendant saw .\ -n m named Brelt Rasnuissen. win • J /; acuuamtanee of Defendant, 
Kasnmssen. The deputy refused (he K-qnes! *2 * : hereai'e*. ,* d ieUivc exaiui.K o 
Dr« idant's person d pr«ip»-rp n ^ he jail and seized certain items lor e\ ulentiarv 
purpu ^ i 
impound '*»1 and. uuhr-hi - *\ .u rant, seized a walkic-talkk iu\* ua\ radio box :- >m 
Defendant's car. See R. at 1260, pp. 5 7. 
Both the *\ -....v ...... .:. i . ,. u. < -. i 
Utah Constitution protect people worn unreasonable search and seizure of "their proper , 
;,ii IN -'Ir- *•• if *1-. ! i'ie hookav* i*:\ entor1
 t: *<- • • -*« .a n Pendant* ; proper H is 
complete belorc the Lusk ;.>IC.J *.;: ^.. leuirned to the jail anu .wiz^u ,icm^ v\ J A.ieni.:a. 
personal property. I !K officer may have had right to seize ih» :l!e^ i.' "cook sheet" because the 
inventoi v. Howewi, .aicc ilui piocedure v\as complete*!, the police would need a search warrant 
to seize any other items from defendant's personal property because the purposes of the inventory 
-u i .S Supienie ( ourt nas "never IK ii- .aside the context of inventory search r~ 
administrative inspection, that an officer's motive invalidate^ object velv jitstiliable behavior 
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(1996). But the court has repeatedly indicated for discerning readers that improper ulterior 
motives will be invalidated police conduct in the context of inventory searches. Where Whren, 
id. At 811. The court acknowledged that in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990), it stated that 
"an inventory search must not be used as a rase for a general rummaging in order to discover 
incriminating evidence;" that in Colorado v. Bertine. there had been "no showing that the police, 
who were following standard procedure, acted in bad faith for the sole purpose of investigation": 
and that in New York v. Burger. 482 U.S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987) the court observed in 
upholding the Constitutionality of warrantless administrative inspection, that the search did not 
appear to be "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of...violation of...penal laws." (Emphasis added) 
Significantly, the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976), 
setting forth the high court's first full articulation of the inventory exception, in approving an 
inventory after impoundment of a car left legally parked for an extended period, expressed the 
following caveat: "[T]here is no suggestions whatever that this standard procedure, essentially 
like that following throughout the county, was a pretext concealing an investigatory police 
motive." (Emphasis added). 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has held "that the inventory exception to the 
warrant requirement 'does not apply when the inventory is merely 'a pretext concealing 
an investigatory police motive."" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, at 1138 (Utah 1994) 
(quoting State v. Hvgh, 711 P.2d 264, at 268 (Utah 1985) (quoting South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976)). 
The facts illustrate that the booking inventory at the jail of Defendant's property 
was complete before the task force officer returned to the jail and seized items of 
Defendant's personal property. The officer may have had the right to seize the alleged 
"cook sheet" because the booking deputy recognized its potential evidentiary value when 
she was conducting the inventory. However, once that procedure was completed, a law 
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enforcement agent would need a search warrant to seize any other items from Defeniianl "s 
personal ^ropem because the purposes o! the in\entory had been fulfilled, 
, . ; •-.. d- ! - f . i - • ' * ' u - - • . \ . 
Defendant's personal propcrn at the jail alter the inventory was completed t<-i nc 
purpo^- - iid\\\ :MM/UH - ^ ! - h * v * the prosecution ' • >efendant. Because 
Deteetiu uowci >• .Ktions wcu ., ,i (iLiiiii^siole purpose i elated to an inventory 
search ihc search and seizure of Defendant's proper!\ -\ere unreasonable. 
n\ eiito 1 * ^ :L r *""' 
~
1
—\\ na\e been allowed to iHease he- property (except for the "cook >»heef*. i ai-%oec 
h.* w inted. inel^hna Brett Rastnussen. State v. Hygh ~ I P 2d 264, 268-26L)'[ lal. . y8^ ; 
: ;. • ;en pe t i nitted • -. i . s 
personal proper^ ^ was his right, he <\ onlo noi ha\ e been subjected to the ilk ai. 
S \ J P unless scar !i -riM^ belonuiiv.> in die fi^t place, a search which ultimately produced 
= ide lice that w as '.-_• • . * • . . • 
In United States v. Cohen. 7^h 1 \2d 20 (2d Ch '""C\ .< Wsistant U.S \ltonu-\ 
initiated .« ^arch of inmate Ban ' s cell by prison personnel. 
:... cohen court, stated that 
the record clear!v ie\caK dial the Jul\ ^th search of Barr's cell 
was initiated b\ ".\c prosecutioi:. n«'t prison officials. The 
decision u* seai. n for contraband was not ndtk b\ those 
officials in the best position to cvalnase the secunK needs of 
the institution, nor was the search even eol*»rabl\ notn ated 
by institutional security concerns. The '^npierne court n. 
Hudson did not contemplate a cell search intended solely to 
bolster the prosecution's case against a pre-trial detainee 
awaiting his day in court, it did not ha\ e before it the issue ei 
whether such a search cuufd lawfully be used by government 
prosecutors to uncover information that would a i ^ ! - - M 
i.i ;g additional indictments against a detainee 
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The Cohen court also made the following statement pertinent to the situation in 
Defendant's case: 
The door on prisoner's rights against unreasonable searches 
has not been slammed shut and locked. We take seriously the 
Court's statement that no iron curtain separates prisoners from 
the Constitution, and that the loss of such rights is occasioned 
only by the legitimate needs of institutional security. 
Id. at 23. 
The emphasis on the need to accommodate individual rights to what is recognized as 
legitimate objectives is the dominate theme throughout the Supreme Court's writing on this 
subject. From this it is patent that since no wall of steel and stone separates prisoners from the 
Constitution, prisoner's rights continue to exist. It is the scope of these rights that it is necessarily 
limited by the Board authority prison official must have to ensure institutional security, obviously 
the creation of limitation or condition on the exercise of Constitutional rights is essential to 
orderly prison administration. Yet, because conditioning the exercise of such rights rests on the 
twin-rationale of objective administrators insuring prison security, a limitation imposed on 
prisoners' Constitutional rights cannot stand when the objectives the rationale serves are absent, 
nor any Federal Courts charged with the duty to protect the right of all citizens fulfill that 
obligation merely by paying lip-service to this concept. 
In this case it is plain that no institutional need is being served were it a prison official 
that initiated the search would not be subject to Constitutional challenge ; regardless of whether 
security needs could justify it. But here the search was initiated by the prosecution solely to 
obtain information for a superseding indictment. In our view, this kind of warrantless search of a 
prisoner's cell fall well outside the rational of the decided cases. Barr retains a Fourth 
Amendment right-though much diminished in scope - tangible enough to mount the attack on this 
warrantless search. 
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Since it is clear from the record that the task force searched and seized the personal 
property of Defendant for purelv investigatory purposes, in an unreasonable m a n n e r if! oi me 
evidence seized at the jail troin Defendant's personal prop^. • w i. i • • * 
the trial court. Since it was not, the conviction of Defendant should he reversed and ine east 
i emanded for a n e v t:i iallll ""i. nd to fui ther incorpoi ate this unconstitutional administrative search 
see, U.S. \ ! Buk *i in, 156 F 3d 963, 968, 973 974 (9th Cir 1998) (Pl< tin V iew seizure oi diug 
paraphernalia found inside Defendant's bag, as invalid, as items were discovered in course of 
Search of Vehicle / Impound Lot 
Regard ing the impound *• *i ii is c lear from the u v o n i Defendant w a s arrested -nd Docked 
mobmiv r r vehic les *s the main 'actor n isu ty ing warrani tess searches o! vehicles. Mje L .S . \. 
j nadwick , 4 3 3 U.S ; 's ; ixt unosnobile except ion n a n n l l v ha-vd on !mprae?u;= f\ ^ 
obtaining a warrant give :\ innerent moDiin chr . ic . M . .• -»* K a n o n v \ .-mea M a u \ 
?o7 ( ,S. 1 <2 (1925) (warrant less search o f au tomobi l e \ a !u! because securing a warrant is 
,i pi * t i e r when chicle readily lemuvabi* ' »:.• ; : ' M 1 K 1 U I ; : Vn:\\ ,o . :- ..„KcajTe. l>.?i' h 2 d 1U90 
• ' M o;i»o) {exigent c i rcumstances jus t i f ies \vuiMiiiiv^s search ot \ e h t e l e u l ien pet Honer w a s 
d n v e awav after t reatment in hospital emergency room) ; U.S. v. Reed, 26 F 3d 523 p " " 
certain = :.ou ' i ian\ x ^ o l Ke>s (^ .f car exis ted and \ e h i c k \\ = - ut-iio.ihK- to efforts o: s t i l u s ,\iw. 
might escape with e\ idence): Smith v. 1 hornberg . 13b I nl 0 7 0 ( 6 : ' < n l w X ) ( c x i ' j it 
v\hen vcnicie could have s l ipped out of gear and injured someone) ; i .S. v. Markhng . i ni 
1 l 0 o , "T,j (*ir, 1993) (exigent e i rc ians ianees jus t i f ied warran t less search of vehicle because 
" :• "' -" =• • 3s< >c • . ; >\ e c i u i ii ; ill) I i me); 1 J.S. v , Mai tin 806 F 2< 1 204 (8 t h 
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Cir. 1986) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of vehicle because owners were 
aware of investigation and truck was readily accessible to public streets); U.S. v. Forker, 928 
F.2d 365 (11th Cir. 1991) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless search of vehicle because 
officers were not certain how many sets of keys to the car existed or whether the car would 
remain in the parking lot if a warrant was sought and officers had not apprehended all suspects 
or other people involved in the conspiracy and the vehicle was vulnerable to efforts of 
defendant's cohorts to seize or destroy evidence). 
In this case Defendant's vehicle was impounded and in the custody of the police at 
a police impound lot and secured. The vehicle was therefore immobilized and possessing 
no other threat that would justify a warrantless search some twelve days following the 
completion of the impound inventory search. 
The impound inventory of Defendant's car was complete on January 21, 1999. On 
that day, the legitimate, recognized purpose of an inventory search was completed. No 
consent was given to the officers to perform a search of the vehicle. No other exception to 
the warrant requirement would apply to an automobile housed in a police impound lot. 
Therefore, the law enforcement officers, when they returned on February 2, 1999 to 
obtain an item from Defendant's vehicle, should have obtained a warrant to search 
Defendant's car and subsequently seize the box from the vehicle. They did not obtain 
such a warrant, but simply entered Defendant's vehicle and removed a potentially 
incriminating piece of evidence. In this case it is clear that the vehicle was impounded and in 
the custody of the police at a police impound, and therefor immobilized, and posing no threat to 
justify a warrantless search some (12) twelve days following the completion of the impound 
inventory search. See Lavickv v. Burnett, 758 F. 2d 48, 475 (10th Cir. 1985) (warrantless seizure 
and search of Defendant's truck invalid because vehicle immobile due to dismantled engine and 
on private property). The police would need a warrant to repeat a search already conducted for a 
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more extensive search, "Investigatory purposes." see U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115-21 
(police may repeat search already conducted by private party but must obtain warrant before 
conducting more extensive search of container or contents). It is clear the purpose of an inventory 
search is to satisfy (3) three purposes, 1) To protect the owner's property while it is in police 
custody; 2) To protect the police against claims of lost of stolen property; and 3) To protect the 
police from potential danger. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); Illinois v. 
Lafayette. 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); see 
e.g., U.S. v. Ford, 986 F. 2d 57, 60 (4th Cir. 1993) (inventory search of car valid to protect against 
danger and false claims of loss); U.S. v. Lage, 183 F. 3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999) (inventory 
search of truck extended to engine compartment invalid). The legitimate purpose of the inventory 
search was concluded on January 21, 1999. The record indicated that the second look/search 
conducted on February 2, 1999 was clearly for investigatory purposes, obtaining and seizing 
evidence to aid in the investigation, and prosecution of the Defendant's which is not a legitimate 
purpose of an inventory search, see U.S. v. Marshall 986 F. 2d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(invalid inventory search of vehicle when officers indicated purpose of search to find evidence of 
criminal activity); U.S. v. Johnson, 820 F. 2d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1987) (Invalid inventory search 
of sealed envelope in which officers previously placed currency found on defendant at time of 
arrest because motivation for search to determine whether currency came from series of bank 
robberies); U.S. v. Blaze, 143 F. 3d 585, 592 (10th Cir. 1998) (invalid inventory search of vehicle 
because officers admitted to investigatory purpose in stumbled - upon drug deal, failed to follow 
set procedures, and failed to catalogue items found in trunk); U.S. v. Khourv. 901 F. 2d 948, 957-
60 (11th Cir. 1990) (invalid search because inventory exception did not justify second look at 
inventoried diary when motivated by investigatory purpose). See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 272-73; 
U.S. v. Thompson. 29 F. 3d, 62, 66 (2nd Cir. 1994) (same); U.S. v. Castro: 129 F. 3d 752, 755 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (invalid inventory search of vehicle because search was immediately preceded by 
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obvious attempt to obtain incrimination evidence of drug dealing); U.S. v. Rodriguez-Morales, 
929 F. 2d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1991) (inventory search valid when caretaking motive not mere 
subterfuge for coexisting desire to investigate); U.S. v. Decker, 19 F. 3d 287, 289 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(valid inventory search of vehicle when at time vehicle seized officers in possession of valid 
search warrant authorizing vehicle search); U.S. v. Franks. 864 F. 2d 992, 1001 (3rd Cir. 1998) 
(inventory search valid when non-investigatory motive present in addition to motive to 
investigate known fugitive). 
Further, the Courts' attention is called to Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 
(1990) wherein the court clearly sets forth the valid purpose of the automobile impound-
inventory exception to the search warrant requirement. Evidence gathering is not one of those 
purposes. 
For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully requested that this court rule that the 
district court should have suppressed the evidence seized by the police authorities under color of 
the "book inventory" and the evidence seized from Defendant's automobile on February 2, 1999, 
and reverse the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment of the lower court and remand the case 
back for a new trial. 
ISSUE V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED 
UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY. 
As described more completely in the Statement of Facts above, the district court failed 
to limit Larry J. Overson's identification testimony at trial. At the preliminary hearing on this 
matter Mr. Overson identified Defendant as one of the two persons who purchased iodine in 
his store on January 14, 1999. However, Mr. Overson's identification of Defendant was not 
only assisted by Defendant being seated at the defense counsel's table and attired in prison 
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garb, but was also prompted to give his identification by a leading question by the state 
prosecutor. 
The prosecutor asked Mr. Overson the following question: "Is one of the 
individuals that you saw on January 14th in your store seated at the table on my left?" 
Therefore, as a result of the prosecutor essentially pointing out Defendant to the witness 
for the purposes of identification, Mr. Overson's identification is forever tainted. 
(Mr. Overson could also not identify or recall seeing another person (Karen Hardy) who 
had earlier been in the court room for the preliminary hearing, and who, in fact, had been 
the person who actually purchased the iodine in question directly from Mr. Overson (Tr. 
6,11)). 
Admitting the tainted eyewitness testimony violated Defendant's right to a fair trail 
under the United States and Utah Constitutions. In State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1986) Utah courts received guidance on how to evaluate the value of eyewitness 
identification with the following list of factors by which reliability of such identification 
must be determined: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the 
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) 
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, 
remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind 
of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether 
the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
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Long, 721 P.2d at 493. The District Court failed to issue an order directing the State's 
witness, Larry J. Overson not to identify the Defendant as one of the two (2) people that 
purchased tincture on Iondine at his store. At the Preliminary Hearing herein, Mr. 
Overson identified the Defendant as (1) of the two (2) persons that purchased said Iodine 
in his store on January 14, 1999 (Tr. 8-10). At that time the Defendant was seated at 
counsel table; next to defense counsel and was attired in prison garb. 
For the reasons stated above it was respectfully requested that this Court reverse 
and remand with an order that the district court suppress the tainted eyewitness testimony 
by Mr. Larry Overson. Given the overly suggestive manner in which the initial 
identification occurred, the eye-witness testimony was thereafter inherently unreliable and 
it was unfairly prejudicial to the Defense to allow that testimony to be elicited at trial. 
ISSUE VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED [N ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE A JAIL 
"KITE" OR LETTER (TRIAL EXHIBIT #28) WHERE THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO ALLOW THE LETTER INTO EVIDENCE. 
At trial the State introduced, with the Defense's objection being overruled, a jail "kite" or 
letter purported to have been written by the Defendant, which contained incriminating statements 
which the State utilized as evidence that Defendant was attempting to convey to a co-defendant 
his encouragement that they stick together and not cut a deal with the State, and suggesting to the 
co-defendant that she get the key to the box holding the methamphetamine lab so, purportedly, 
evidence could be taken and/or destroyed. 
The Defense objected for lack of foundation, and the Court overruled the objection. The 
Court stated that the only foundation for the letter was the testimony of a co-defendant who 
indicated she could recognize the handwriting as the Defendant's handwriting. See R. 1257, p. 
520 (Court states: " . . . It is the identity of this, lay identification of that handwriting as Mr. 
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Messer's, which is the sole basis for the court's admission of it."). 
There was insufficient foundation to allow the admittance of said letter/kite into evidence. 
See Utah Rules of Evidence 104; Utah Rules of Evidence 901. "The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Utah 
Rules of Evidence 901. The only foundation here was the general, non-scientific, lay 
identification of the handwriting. Although a lay person can generally identify handwriting with 
which the witness is familiar, see State v. Freshwater, 85 P.2d 447 (Utah 1906), here there is a 
dearth of other foundational evidence which, coupled with the lay testimony regarding 
handwriting identification, should have made the kite inadmissible for lack of foundation. The 
letter/kite was not seized from the Defendant or his cell, but in fact from another inmate's person. 
There was no testimony by the seizing jailer, or from the inmate from whom the letter/kite was 
seized, but only a co-defendant's lay testimony that the handwriting looked like the Defendant's 
handwriting. This testimony does not establish the time, place, or other background facts 
regarding the letter, and furthermore this handwriting analysis was from a lay witness and her 
identification testimony regarding the letter did not flow from her commenting on its comments, 
creation, sending or delivery, context, etc., and thus her ability to testimony is essentially that of a 
handwriting expert, which she was not (nor did the State purport that she was). Excluding a 
letter where there is inadequate foundation is appropriate. See, e.g., Murdoch v. Farrell, 163 P. 
1102 (Utah 1917). It could not be established as to where the letter had come from, where it had 
been, who had handled it, altered it, etc. Thus, this letter had insufficient foundation and should 
have been excluded. 
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ISSUE VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE 
WITNESS, MR. PAUL HALSTEAD, ON THE BASIS OF HEARSAY, AND THE 
TESTIMONY OF MR. TROY THODE ON THE BASIS OF IT BEING TOO 
COLLATERAL TO THE ISSUES AT TRIAL. 
The Defense sought at trial to have Mr. Paul Halstead, who had been a cell mate of 
State's witness, Mr. Ervin Hasch, testify that Ervin Hasch, was attempting to pin the 
methamphetamine lab on Mr. Messer rather than having to answer for it himself. The Court did 
not allow this testimony based on the determination that it was hearsay and on the fact that the 
Defense did not reveal the Defense's intention to put on this hearsay testimony to the State until a 
point during the trial. The Court determined it could not come in, due to this lack of notice, and 
the Court cited Utah Rules of Evidence 803(24). Id. This testimony, however, directly 
undermined evidence obtained from and through Mr. Hasch, which was central to the case, and if 
in fact he stated to a fellow inmate that he was trying to pin the methamphetamine charge on the 
Defendant rather than himself, is so crucial that the notice requirement should have been relaxed; 
the State did not indicate that it was particularly prejudiced in any specific way, but rather sought 
simply to rely on the notice requirement as a means to block the critical, defense-friendly 
testimony. 
Furthermore, the testimony was inconsistent with other statements of Mr. Hasch as 
revealed at trial, and was an admission of a co-conspirator and thus not hearsay, pursuant to Rule 
801(d)(1) (prior inconsistent statement) and (2) (admission of party-opponent). Certainly 
statements amounting to the fact that Mr. Hasch was trying to pin the crime on the Defendant so 
as to avoid liability himself, would count as statements inconsistent with his statements that the 
Defendant, in truth of fact, committed the acts which constituted the crime in this case. Prior 
inconsistent statements are not hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Heaps, 711 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985). 
Further, while Mr. Hasch was not a defendant in this trial, he was a co-conspirator in the 
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commission of these methamphetamine crimes, and co-conspirator's admissions are admissible. 
See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989). 
The Defense also sought at trial to put on testimony from bail bondsman Troy Thode 
regarding a woman he'd previously bailed out of jail, State's witness Karen Hardy. The 
testimony in question, which was not allowed by the Court, was that Ms. Hardy had been bailed 
out by him, and had secured the transaction with some jewelry and two vehicles; and that the 
vehicles, when the bondsman went to tow them to hold them, were gone; and that the jewelry 
turned out to be reportedly stolen from another State's witnesses' (Todd Farnsworth's) house; 
and that she had jumped bail. The Court did not allow this testimony, on the basis that it was 
"impeachment in a far too collateral issue." While it is true that the evidence which could have 
been elicited from Troy Thode did not deal with the exact issues of this trial, it was credible 
evidence of dishonesty of an important State witness, and should have been revealed to the jury 
so that the jury could evaluate the credibility of that witness. Generally, impeachment testimony 
is admissible if it goes to credibility, even though it introduces evidence which would be 
otherwise inadmissible. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991). While specific 
acts of misconduct that do not result in criminal convictions are sometimes, or generally, 
inadmissible to impeach a witness, see, e.g., State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978), in this 
instant the testimony was so compelling and so important because it directly undermined the 
credibility of the State's witness, and had to do with specific acts of dishonestly in dealing with 
the criminal justice system (treatment of a bondsman and bond-jumping) that it should have been 
allowed so that the truth could be known about this witness, and the Defendant allowed a fair 
trial. 
The denial of the Defendant's opportunity to put on relevant evidence which would 
potentially vindicate him by damaging the State's case and raising reasonable doubt strips him of 
his constitutional right to a fair trial in which he is able to put on evidence which calls into 
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question the State's case and allows him to defend himself. See Utah Rules of Evidence 608; 
Utah Rules of Evidence 804; U.S. Constitution Amend., VI and XIV, as well as the Utah 
Constitution Article I, Section 7, and 12. Evidentiary rules should be relaxed to allow evidence 
vital to a criminal defendant's defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 
1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). 
The Cout's Evidentiary Errors were Not Harmless 
Regarding the evidentiary arguments and issues discussed above, the Defendant is 
required to show not only error, but that any errors were not harmless. See, e.g., Hall v. NACM 
Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97,ffl[ 21, 988 P.2d 942. As for issues II, IV and V, these items go 
to the discovery of the methamphetamine lab which is the heart of this case. Certainly if error 
occurred with respect to these issues, then they cannot be said to have been harmless, for they 
allowed the methamphetamine lab itself to come into evidence. As for issues V, the eye witness 
testimony was crucial and cannot be said to have been harmless. The lab in question was not 
found in the possession of the Defendant, or in Defendant's house or car. Thus eye-witness 
testimony linking him t the lab was critical for the success of the prosecution. And, as for issue 
VI, the impeachment of crucial State witnesses, particularly the disallowed impeachment of one 
witness as to that witness's statement to a fellow inmate that he was trying to pin the charge on 
the Defendant, is absolutely critical and cannot be said to be harmless either, since it could have 
convinced the jury that the lab belonged to that State's witness (it was found in the trunk of his 
car) rather than the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this Court should reverse the conviction and remand for 
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new trial. 
Dated this '$ day of f V-S. 2005, 
BARNES f^e 4LLEN, LLP 
Randall C. Allen 
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I hereby certify that on this the | V day of M *~^ , 2005,1 
did cause two copies of this brief to be sent by US mail to: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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ADDENDUM 
Second Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment 
HLhD 
SCOTT F GARRETT (#8687) 
Iron County Attorney 
82 North 100 East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435)865-5310 
Telecopier: (435) 865-5329 
CJth G:^r-..-,<' COU?l'i 
IRON COUNTY ' j V l y 
DEPUTY CLERK. 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
TERRY ARNOLD MESSER JR 
d o b 03/20/73. 
Defendant. 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT, 
SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT 
Criminal No 991500647 
Judge James L Shumate 
The Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., having been convicted by a duly 
empaneled jury of his peers of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR 
SUPPLIES, as enhanced to a First-Degree Felony, and the jury having also found the following 
enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) that the Defendant did possess said laboratory 
equipment or supplies within 500 feet of a residence; (2) that the Defendant did possess said 
laboiatory equipment or supplies for the production of methamphetamine or methamphetamine base, 
and (3) that the Defendant did illegally possess, transport, or dispose of hazardous or dangerous 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation, and said materials 
caused a substantial risk to human health or safety, and the jury having found the Defendant guilty. 
as well as found the enhancements, beyond a reasonable doubt on October 25, 2001, and the Court 
accepted said guilty verdict and thereafter ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation 
report and scheduled the matter for sentencing; and on or about November 5, 2001, the Defendant, 
by and through his then attorney, Jim Scarth, filed a request to re-schedule the sentencing in the 
above-entitled matter, and the Defendant having asserted that he waived his right to a presentence 
investigation report, and after having received the Defendant's motion, the Court having called the 
matter on for sentencing on December 3, 2001, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named 
Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER JR., having appeared before the Court in person, together 
with his then attorney of record, James R. Scarth, and the State of Utah having appeared by and 
through then Deputy Iron County Attorney Scott F. Garrett, and the Court having reviewed the file 
in detail and thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy 
Iron County Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the 
following Second Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit: 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, TERRY 
ARNOLD MESSER, JR., has been found guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, by a duly empaneled 
jury, of the offense of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR 
SUPPLIES, as enhanced to a First-Degree Felony. Further, the jury found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the following enhancements, to wit: (1) that the Defendant did possess said laboratory 
equipment or supplies within 500 feet of a residence; (2) that the Defendant did possess said 
laboratory equipment or supplies for the production of methamphetamine or methamphetamine base; 
and (3) that the Defendant did illegally possess, transport, or dispose of hazardous or dangerous 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operation, and said materials 
caused a substantial risk to human health or safety. The Court having asked whether the Defendant 
had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause 
to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as 
charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, JR., and 
pursuant to his conviction of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF LABORATORY EQUIPMENT OR 
SUPPLIES, as enhanced to a First-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
in the Utah State Prison for a period of not less than five (5) years and not more than the term of his 
natural life. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be given credit for time served to date. 
Specifically, the Defendant shall be given credit for time served from January 21. 1999. to 
October 21. 2004, for a total of 2,100 days. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, TERRY ARNOLD MESSER 
JR., and deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be held under the provisions 
of the foregoing Second Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this / day of March, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
^1 _A_ 
JAMES L. SHUMATE \ 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Second 
Amended Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Terry Arnold 
Messer Jr., Criminal No. 991500647, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
this * ( day of March, 2005. 
c 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
YN8ULLOCH 
( S E A L ) 
By:. f/'X' 
Deputy District Court Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, by first-class mail, 
postage fully prepaid, on this *~ day of March, 2005, to the following, to wit: 
Mr. Glenn C. Halterman 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 1472 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-1472 
Assistant 
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